A Historical Perspective On the Ukraine Crisis
Posted on 21 Feb 2022; 11:50 PM IST. Last Updated 21 Feb 2022; 11:50 PM IST.Summary: This article provides a historical perspective on the Ukraine crisis, and recalls how decades of diplomacy of the past US administrations, could shed light on how the current ongoing Ukraine crisis could be resolved.
Historically, Ukraine is known as “little Russia”, and has deep ties with Russia, for more than a thousand years. How these people have become so alienated with Russia is a serious concern, and a part of the ongoing crisis.
Of course, “EU membership” could be attractive to Ukraine, due to economical benefits, and Ukraine could be more willing to join the West, than remain closer to Russia. In such a case, the Ukraine squabble should be limited to Ukraine, EU, and Russia, which are all part and parcel of Europe.
US has little or no social relationship with Ukraine, and is thousands of miles away from it. The American intervention in Ukraine, could have made the long simmering differences between Ukraine and Russia worse, and could have created the current crisis.
It may be recalled from history, that “Lenin” was a tiny force, when he was sent back from Germany to his homeland Russia. Lenin grew by leaps and bounds in Russia, and plunged Russia into communism.
Russia could be seeking guarantees from USA and EU, that Ukraine does not grow or transform into something that could threaten the existence of Russia, in future. This is the relatively new diplomatic crisis, precipitated by the current US administration.
Decades of diplomacy by US administrations in the past, forged the Eastern and Western European nations into European Union, and this exemplary feat would not have been possible, without the Noble gestures of Russia.
Sadly, Russia did not get anything in return for its Nobel gestures (excluding the photo opportunities). This raises the question on what Russia actually bargained for ceding control of Eastern Europe.
Gorbachev the Soviet General Secretary, did not bargain hard, while ceding control of Eastern Europe. At the same time, he did not drop the aspirations of his predecessor Brezhnev, who is often credited with the idea of “Common European Home”, in which Russia finds its due share.
Gorbachev did not get a written assurance on a “Common European Home”, but he presented this idea to the West, and received very encouraging response from US President George W Bush (Senior), who proposed a similar idea, which reads as “A WHOLE EUROPE, A FREE EUROPE”, on 31 MAY 1989.
The Brezhnev/Gorbachev doctrine of “Common European Home” eulogized by President Bush (senior) as “A WHOLE EUROPE”, could be regarded as the pivotal architecture for providing safety, security and prosperity for all of Europe.
It is very interesting to note that the notion “Not an inch Eastward (for NATO Troops)”, was originally invented and proposed by Western diplomats (James Baker), and Russia caught on to it later.
Boris Yeltsin, never gave up on the “Not an inch Eastward” theme, during his entire tenure, even when he was literally drowning in the vodka bottle.
Unlike his successor “Yeltsin”, the dovish Gorbachev did not bargain for “No NATO boots in Eastern Europe”, since “it would have become apparent for Gorbachev, that when Poland joins EU, NATO is almost at the doorsteps of Russia”.
What the dovish Gorbachev bargained under “Common European Home” is -
a) No European nation would take a hostile stance towards Russia.
b) Russia would be integrated into the European economy, i.e Europe cannot apply economic sanctions on Russia.
By the time President Putin assumed power, EU grew from a little puppy into a roaring Lion. President Putin wanted the rights of a EU member state for Russia, without formally joining EU. Sadly, Putin did not get what he wanted, instead he got a whole set of independent agreements, assurances, etc., which do not add up to what is requested by Putin, or assured by West to Gorbachev.
In essence, while the “Common European Home” aspiration of Russia (by Brezhnev) took shape as European Union (EU), and although Russia ceded control of Eastern Europe, Russia did not get a proper footing or place in the common European home.
It is obligatory for US and EU to adopt the Gorbachev-Bush doctrine of a “Common European Home” or “A WHOLE EUROPE” (in which Russia finds its due share), to resolve the current crisis in Ukraine, rather than by looking at the crisis, from the perspective of the “NATO spectrum”.